Hegelian externalism?

Externalist theories of mind hold that at least sometimes mental states are best decribed as including processes, events, or things that are not accessible to consciousness.

The classic example involves two worlds one of which has H2O water and another has phenomenologically indistinguishable water with a different chemical composition (XYZ). If we imagine two people, Sally and George in each of the different worlds both thinking "water is wet" We should conclude that while there is no phenomenological distinction between the two thoughts, nevertheless the content of the two thoughts are different. One is about XYZ water, the other is about H2O water.

Could Hegel be an externalist in this sense? It is easy to see the advantage of interpreting Hegel in this way. Hegelian Spirit extends far beyond individual consciouness' usual haunts and externalism about mind seems to provide a nice way of making sense of this larger, cosmic sense of spirit.

But I don't think this interpretation can be right. Here's why"

(1) Whatever Hegelian idealism is, it at least includes the claim that there are no distinct objects, events etc without concepts. In the Sense Certainty chapter of the Phenomenology it is shown that as soon as we think of a bare sensation, the sensation ceases to be bare, it becomes conceptualized.

(2) concepts do not exist independently of consciousness

I think it follows from these two propositions that there can be no water of an XYZ or H2O variety independent of consciousness. Therefore externalist readings of Hegel put the cart before the horse. We must begin with consciousness and end with consciousness. The apparent divide between object and subject is merely an internal device that spirit has for realizing itself, for becoming conscious of itself.

I guess an externalist would reply that I am beging the question, assuming that consciousness is not itself understood in an externalist way.

I think that a natural reading of the phenomenology belies this objection. In order to enter into sense-certainty, we have to put ourselves in the place of consciousess, we must try to imagine what it is like to be "this here now" consciousness. Only in doing so can we see the internal contradiction that results from this attempt to grasp the mere sensation. The whole phenomenology is an attempt to show how Spirit comes to realize itself *from the inside* The move beyond individual subjectivity is not a move away from an interior conception of consciousness, but rather a way of extending the scope beyond such ordinary finite conceptions.

To take an example: When I think about money, I am thinking of an entity that only has reality in the context of a society. So consciousness of money cannot be understood except in the context of a larger consciousness, one that is greater than me and in some way includes other minds. But this move beyond me takes place within my consciousness--it is this consciousness who tries to grasp what money is, and who finds that in grasping this object essential relation is made to minds other than my own.

I am not endorsing this particular argument against solipsism, but it seems to be how Hegel proceeds (if memory serves, I have yet to look back at the text).

This way of proceeding only makes sense from an internalist perspective.