Monday, February 22, 2010

Reincarnation

There are certain children who are reported to remember past lives. I don't feel equipped to evaluate the question whether such children really exist or whether the reports are accurately described. You can find descriptions of them in Ian Stevenson's work and also in Robert Almeder's book on empirical evidence for the afterlife.

I have in mind cases such as a child seeming to remember being another person, that person not being known by by the child or her family. The things the child seems to remember then turn out ot be true (there really was a person names x, who did y , etc).

Now it seems to me that such cases provide prima facie support for reincarnation. If these "seeming to remember" experiences occur, they provide some support for the thesis that persons sometimes exist prior to their current embodied existence.

Not everyone agrees though. Thus Steven Hales argues that regardless of how well supported, empirically, the particular cases are, it is still not rational to believe they support reincarnation.

The reason given is that we know of no mechanism by which it is possible for a person to continue to exist after death or exist prior to current life. Currently popular materialist theories of mind rule out the very idea of persons existing in some other incarnation.

I don't think this objection is telling because (1) there are good philosophical reasons to object to materialism, appart from appeal to reincarnation type cases (2) It seems that mind body dualism is a theory, and as such is able to make sense of how it is a person can exist prior to or after their current life.

It might be objected that dualism is not a scientific theory, but neither is materialism. The most that can be said is that materialism is suggested by some current scientific research. The empirical data is compatible with dualism, materialism or even idealism.

Cases of the reincarnation type would count as evidence even if we agreed with Hume regarding miracles. Reincarnation, if it occurs, would violate no law of nature.

Saturday, February 13, 2010

Disembodied Existence

I have not done much research, but it appears that lot of philosophers deny that disembodied existence is logically or conceptually possible. I don't mean those who hold that given a certain ontology of mind (e.g. materialism) a person cannot exist without her body. I rather have in mind those who think that the very notion of a person existing without his body is incoherent.



As I say, I have not done the research, but it looks like the main reason people hold that disembodied existence is impossible is that when you think through the idea you realize that you cannot make sense out of it. There is some deep contradiction or absurdity in the very idea of me existing without my body.



The best way to respond to this sort of argument is to show that one can easily understand what it means to be disembodied. Consider the following argument:



(1) The senses are fallible

(2) If the senses are fallible, then it is possible that all my current beliefs about my body that are derived from senses are in error

(3) The belief that I am embodied now is derived from my senses



Therefore, (4) It is possible that all my current beliefs about my body, including that I have one, are in error.



I don't see how anyone can deny (1). Maybe (2) is false. It could be that while the senses are fallible, there is something special about sensed body. I guess one could hold that kineasthetic sensations are epistemically privledged, or something like that. But then what would one do with phantom limbs?



Note that (2) does not say that it is possible that *all* the beliefs that I derive from sense percepti in error. It only says my current beliefs are such. A lot of arguments against skepticism purport to show that while the senses may be mistaken here and there, there is something deeply incoherent about supposing that all my sense derived beliefs are false. I am not overly impressed by these arguments, but even if they are sound, they do not call into question the truth of (2)

Thus even if skeptical arguments fail to show that life could be a big dream, they still serve a very important metaphysical function in helping us to understand what is really involved in the concept of the self.


Can anyone think of a reason to deny (3)



So in order to conceive of yourself as dismbodied, you don't need to go through some elaborate thought experiment or have an out of body experience.. You just need to realize that the senses are fallible. You there, reading this, can easily conceive of yourself disembodied right now.

Yes I know I am just chanelling Descartes here. But what is wrong with the reasoning?

Of course it will still seem to you that you are embodied. Nothing has changed with respect to your experience. That is why its so easy!!


I have intentionally made the argument very weak. It only shows that it is possible for a person to exist without a body. It does not show that each of us can exist without a body all the time, or that we never really have bodies (understood as objective metaphysical realities)