The Philosopher's Howl

I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving hysterical naked, typing countless cover letters

Dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn, searching for the next adjunct position in business ethics

Who poverty and tatters and hollow eyed and high sat up smoking in the all-too-natural darkness, waiting for the next batch of papers on the principle of Universal Izability and the theological views of Aquanaut.

Who finds themselves wondering if the right action really is the one, of the alternatives available, that produces the most pressure

Who spent their last penny on an interviewing suit and a hotel room, only to find Eastern North Dakota Tech has cancelled their search

Who dearly regret forgetting to pack the whiskey

Who dream of metaphysics at night and teach applied ethics by day

Who published, published, published... and perished anyway






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A Bad Argument for Theism

In general, I like arguments for theism. The ontological argument raises fascinationg issues regarding necessity and existence. The cosmological argument may even be sound. But there is one popular argument that I think is just dreadful. This is the argument from morality. I guess it goes something like this:

(1) There are objective moral truths
(2) The best (or maybe only!) way to understand how such truths exist is by supposing there is a God
Therefore, God is likely to exist

That is the rough idea. The key claim is that objective morality makes likely the existence of a deity.

I wonder if proponents of this argument would also accept:

(1) There are objective mathematical truths
(2) The only way to understand how objective mathematical truths exist is to accept the existence of a deity
Therefore, God exists

I guess there are an infinte number of arguments like this--put whatever you want in between "objective" and "truth" and you get some kind of weird theistic argument.

Of course if one agrees that a Divine Command theory of Morality is true, then there is a direct link between moral truths and God. But if DC theory is true, then we don't really have objective morality. We have a variety of subjectivism in which the only subject that matters is God.

There are more subtle versions of the DC theory that somehow relate Divine commands to our obligations while at the same time allowing the objective moral quality Good to be a real property and not just a matter of divine whim. If God is good, then we don't have to worry about God getting all crazy on us with insane commands. But if God's goodness determines the content of the command, then we have escaped the DC theory. If God's goodness does not determine it, then there is still the element of whim.

If we jettison divine command and argue that God's existence grounds morality because of God's nature in instantiating goodness, then, again, God's existence is connected to morality. But if goodness is a genuine property, it does not need God to be instantiated. If there is a God, God will be supremely good, and that's important. But God's existence is not required to support the real existence of moral properties like good or bad.

Agent Causation and Panpsychism

I have recently become fond of the view, found in authors as different as Berkeley and Reid, that not only is there such a thing as agent causation, but that agent causation is the only sort of causation that is out there. It is easy to see why Berkeley would hold this view, given his metaphysics. And Philonous' reply to Hylas' humean bundle theory of the self presents as well as anyone can the intuitive, experiential basis of the belief that minds (or "spirits" in Berkeley's lovely word) are causes.

But suppose we consider a different sort of idealistic metaphysic. Instead supposing there are animal minds and God (and maybe angels and demons), suppose that there is a world independent of both God and finite animal minds. But do not suppose this world to be composed of dumb matter. Suppose it rather to be at its most basic level consisting of simple minds, proto minds maybe even. This is the sort of panpsychism that Hartshorne held and I think its consistent with Sprigge and Chalmers (in his bolder moments) as well as Galen Strawson.

Yet these little minds are not experienced as such. They are known not as minds but as the fundamental particles of physics, of which science provides us with a great deal of structural (but no intrinsic) knowledge.

One structural feature of these particles is that they enter into causal relations with each other. Usually this sort of causation is thought of as "event causation," a notion of cause that, as Hume powerfully argued, we have no intuitive grasp of.

But if these elementary particles are little minds, then should we not start thinking of the causal processes that go on among them as being analogous to that which we are aware of in our moments of decision. It is just an analogy, and one need not imagine and electron deliberating about whether to make this quantum leap or that. All one needs to say is that whatever deep metaphysical fact allows agent causation in us is also present throughout the universe.

Like all idealist theories there is an organic unity and wholeness in this view that split universe dualistic theories lack. Like both dualistic and other idealistic theories, the panpsychist view remainds true to those facts that are most well known to use, the phemomena of our own subjective experience.

Machines of Creation and Annihilation.

A prime motivation behind epiphenomenalism is the belief that only such an account of mind allows for both the genuine non-reductive existence of mental states and the causal closure of the physical world. Materialism gives us causal closure, but denies the reality of the mental. Interactionism gives us the reality of the mental, but only at the cost of sacrificing a basic presupposition of modern science.

Causal closure refers the assumed fact that every physical event has an adequate physical cause. Phenomena in our brains and bodies, like everything else, can be adequately explained by appealing to physical causality. If we assume interactionism to be the case, then there is some tiny bit of energy in our brains that are caused not by physiological processes. When I will my arm to move, there is suddenly in the universe some bit of energy that was not there before. I am a machine of creation, making radically new additions to the universe every time my mind interacts with my body.

Epiphenomenalism it is said,avoids this purportedly absurd conclusion. But does it?

If interactionism is true, then my mind/brain is a machine of creation, but the process works the other way as well. When my brain interacts with my mind physical energy is expended that produces a mental result. Interactionism thus makes me a machine of annihilation as well as creation. Some little bit of energy is expended every time my brain interacts with my mind.

One might think this just makes the situation for the interactionist worse, or at least no better. But what I want to stress is that this latter aspect of interactionism is present also for the epiphenomenalist. Epiphenomenalism is not parallellism. On epiphenomenalist views there is a causal relationship between body and mind, its just that it goes only one way.

So if the causal closure of the physical is assumed, epiphenomenalism must go the way of interactionism, into the dust heap of scientifically disreputable theories of mind.

A response to this argument is to deny that the causal relation between brain and mind involves any real transfer of energy. No one really knows what a "transfer of energy" really is and those of a Humean persuasion may well argue that on a fundamental level there is really no such thing as "energy." There are only lawlike regularities. But if this sort of reply is adequate to account for my existence as an engine of annihilation, why can it not also be used in defense of the creation side of the mind/body relationship.

The I

Could I have been Obama? An argument against materialism

In the linked post Victor Reppert argues against materialism by claiming that a materialist world view will not capture one crucial fact: that he is VR.

We can only talk about this in the first person. So I want to consider the fact that I am Gordon Knight. Who is GK? physically I am a living organism of a certain type, with a certain body with certain brain states etc. Victor contends that an objective description of these physical facts leaves out a crucial one: I am GK. I agree with him , but he does not go far enough.
Suppose we have a complete description of not only the physical, but also the psychological facts of me. So we know not only what my brain state is, but also that I am thinking of Descartes, or having a feeling of pain .. whatever. We need not assume that this psychological description is in any way reducible to the physical. We can have a dualistic third person description of the universe.

But even in this case, something extremely crucial is left out. GK is feeling pain. well, that sucks. But it is very different from: I am feeling pain. We could have a complete description of my psychological qualiites, of what I am feeling, what I am thinking etc..

And yet this description would still leave out something crucial

I can know all about GK's feeling of pain. I might feel sorry for him

However well I know what GK is feeling. that knowledge in itself will not allow me to judge "I am GK" or "I am feeling pain":

The I is transcendental.

Hegelian externalism?

Externalist theories of mind hold that at least sometimes mental states are best decribed as including processes, events, or things that are not accessible to consciousness.

The classic example involves two worlds one of which has H2O water and another has phenomenologically indistinguishable water with a different chemical composition (XYZ). If we imagine two people, Sally and George in each of the different worlds both thinking "water is wet" We should conclude that while there is no phenomenological distinction between the two thoughts, nevertheless the content of the two thoughts are different. One is about XYZ water, the other is about H2O water.

Could Hegel be an externalist in this sense? It is easy to see the advantage of interpreting Hegel in this way. Hegelian Spirit extends far beyond individual consciouness' usual haunts and externalism about mind seems to provide a nice way of making sense of this larger, cosmic sense of spirit.

But I don't think this interpretation can be right. Here's why"

(1) Whatever Hegelian idealism is, it at least includes the claim that there are no distinct objects, events etc without concepts. In the Sense Certainty chapter of the Phenomenology it is shown that as soon as we think of a bare sensation, the sensation ceases to be bare, it becomes conceptualized.

(2) concepts do not exist independently of consciousness

I think it follows from these two propositions that there can be no water of an XYZ or H2O variety independent of consciousness. Therefore externalist readings of Hegel put the cart before the horse. We must begin with consciousness and end with consciousness. The apparent divide between object and subject is merely an internal device that spirit has for realizing itself, for becoming conscious of itself.

I guess an externalist would reply that I am beging the question, assuming that consciousness is not itself understood in an externalist way.

I think that a natural reading of the phenomenology belies this objection. In order to enter into sense-certainty, we have to put ourselves in the place of consciousess, we must try to imagine what it is like to be "this here now" consciousness. Only in doing so can we see the internal contradiction that results from this attempt to grasp the mere sensation. The whole phenomenology is an attempt to show how Spirit comes to realize itself *from the inside* The move beyond individual subjectivity is not a move away from an interior conception of consciousness, but rather a way of extending the scope beyond such ordinary finite conceptions.

To take an example: When I think about money, I am thinking of an entity that only has reality in the context of a society. So consciousness of money cannot be understood except in the context of a larger consciousness, one that is greater than me and in some way includes other minds. But this move beyond me takes place within my consciousness--it is this consciousness who tries to grasp what money is, and who finds that in grasping this object essential relation is made to minds other than my own.

I am not endorsing this particular argument against solipsism, but it seems to be how Hegel proceeds (if memory serves, I have yet to look back at the text).

This way of proceeding only makes sense from an internalist perspective.

Reincarnation

There are certain children who are reported to remember past lives. I don't feel equipped to evaluate the question whether such children really exist or whether the reports are accurately described. You can find descriptions of them in Ian Stevenson's work and also in Robert Almeder's book on empirical evidence for the afterlife.

I have in mind cases such as a child seeming to remember being another person, that person not being known by by the child or her family. The things the child seems to remember then turn out ot be true (there really was a person names x, who did y , etc).

Now it seems to me that such cases provide prima facie support for reincarnation. If these "seeming to remember" experiences occur, they provide some support for the thesis that persons sometimes exist prior to their current embodied existence.

Not everyone agrees though. Thus Steven Hales argues that regardless of how well supported, empirically, the particular cases are, it is still not rational to believe they support reincarnation.

The reason given is that we know of no mechanism by which it is possible for a person to continue to exist after death or exist prior to current life. Currently popular materialist theories of mind rule out the very idea of persons existing in some other incarnation.

I don't think this objection is telling because (1) there are good philosophical reasons to object to materialism, appart from appeal to reincarnation type cases (2) It seems that mind body dualism is a theory, and as such is able to make sense of how it is a person can exist prior to or after their current life.

It might be objected that dualism is not a scientific theory, but neither is materialism. The most that can be said is that materialism is suggested by some current scientific research. The empirical data is compatible with dualism, materialism or even idealism.

Cases of the reincarnation type would count as evidence even if we agreed with Hume regarding miracles. Reincarnation, if it occurs, would violate no law of nature.