Agent Causation and Panpsychism

I have recently become fond of the view, found in authors as different as Berkeley and Reid, that not only is there such a thing as agent causation, but that agent causation is the only sort of causation that is out there. It is easy to see why Berkeley would hold this view, given his metaphysics. And Philonous' reply to Hylas' humean bundle theory of the self presents as well as anyone can the intuitive, experiential basis of the belief that minds (or "spirits" in Berkeley's lovely word) are causes.

But suppose we consider a different sort of idealistic metaphysic. Instead supposing there are animal minds and God (and maybe angels and demons), suppose that there is a world independent of both God and finite animal minds. But do not suppose this world to be composed of dumb matter. Suppose it rather to be at its most basic level consisting of simple minds, proto minds maybe even. This is the sort of panpsychism that Hartshorne held and I think its consistent with Sprigge and Chalmers (in his bolder moments) as well as Galen Strawson.

Yet these little minds are not experienced as such. They are known not as minds but as the fundamental particles of physics, of which science provides us with a great deal of structural (but no intrinsic) knowledge.

One structural feature of these particles is that they enter into causal relations with each other. Usually this sort of causation is thought of as "event causation," a notion of cause that, as Hume powerfully argued, we have no intuitive grasp of.

But if these elementary particles are little minds, then should we not start thinking of the causal processes that go on among them as being analogous to that which we are aware of in our moments of decision. It is just an analogy, and one need not imagine and electron deliberating about whether to make this quantum leap or that. All one needs to say is that whatever deep metaphysical fact allows agent causation in us is also present throughout the universe.

Like all idealist theories there is an organic unity and wholeness in this view that split universe dualistic theories lack. Like both dualistic and other idealistic theories, the panpsychist view remainds true to those facts that are most well known to use, the phemomena of our own subjective experience.

Machines of Creation and Annihilation.

A prime motivation behind epiphenomenalism is the belief that only such an account of mind allows for both the genuine non-reductive existence of mental states and the causal closure of the physical world. Materialism gives us causal closure, but denies the reality of the mental. Interactionism gives us the reality of the mental, but only at the cost of sacrificing a basic presupposition of modern science.

Causal closure refers the assumed fact that every physical event has an adequate physical cause. Phenomena in our brains and bodies, like everything else, can be adequately explained by appealing to physical causality. If we assume interactionism to be the case, then there is some tiny bit of energy in our brains that are caused not by physiological processes. When I will my arm to move, there is suddenly in the universe some bit of energy that was not there before. I am a machine of creation, making radically new additions to the universe every time my mind interacts with my body.

Epiphenomenalism it is said,avoids this purportedly absurd conclusion. But does it?

If interactionism is true, then my mind/brain is a machine of creation, but the process works the other way as well. When my brain interacts with my mind physical energy is expended that produces a mental result. Interactionism thus makes me a machine of annihilation as well as creation. Some little bit of energy is expended every time my brain interacts with my mind.

One might think this just makes the situation for the interactionist worse, or at least no better. But what I want to stress is that this latter aspect of interactionism is present also for the epiphenomenalist. Epiphenomenalism is not parallellism. On epiphenomenalist views there is a causal relationship between body and mind, its just that it goes only one way.

So if the causal closure of the physical is assumed, epiphenomenalism must go the way of interactionism, into the dust heap of scientifically disreputable theories of mind.

A response to this argument is to deny that the causal relation between brain and mind involves any real transfer of energy. No one really knows what a "transfer of energy" really is and those of a Humean persuasion may well argue that on a fundamental level there is really no such thing as "energy." There are only lawlike regularities. But if this sort of reply is adequate to account for my existence as an engine of annihilation, why can it not also be used in defense of the creation side of the mind/body relationship.

The I

Could I have been Obama? An argument against materialism

In the linked post Victor Reppert argues against materialism by claiming that a materialist world view will not capture one crucial fact: that he is VR.

We can only talk about this in the first person. So I want to consider the fact that I am Gordon Knight. Who is GK? physically I am a living organism of a certain type, with a certain body with certain brain states etc. Victor contends that an objective description of these physical facts leaves out a crucial one: I am GK. I agree with him , but he does not go far enough.
Suppose we have a complete description of not only the physical, but also the psychological facts of me. So we know not only what my brain state is, but also that I am thinking of Descartes, or having a feeling of pain .. whatever. We need not assume that this psychological description is in any way reducible to the physical. We can have a dualistic third person description of the universe.

But even in this case, something extremely crucial is left out. GK is feeling pain. well, that sucks. But it is very different from: I am feeling pain. We could have a complete description of my psychological qualiites, of what I am feeling, what I am thinking etc..

And yet this description would still leave out something crucial

I can know all about GK's feeling of pain. I might feel sorry for him

However well I know what GK is feeling. that knowledge in itself will not allow me to judge "I am GK" or "I am feeling pain":

The I is transcendental.