Recall Descartes' famous dictum that "I exist" can be known with certainty prior to any other knowledge. Now if my existence is really what is first known, it cannot be an inference. If Descartes reasoned "Everything that thinks, exists"/"I think" "THerefore, I exist, my existence would not be the first thing known. it would depend on some general and controversial premises. For these reasons I think the cogito has to be understood as an immediate intuition--an insight into the necessary connection between "me" and "existence"
But the "I" or "me" may be too metaphysically robust. We may argue, contra Descartes, that what is known to exist is not the metaphysical subject, but consciousness--particular moments of awareness.
If that is so, then we should more conservatively claim: There is a necessary connection between consciousness and existence.
why a necessary connection? Well, if it was merely contingent, if there could be a consciousness that did not exist, then even this truncated cogito fails. But this more limited cogito is probably the least controversial of all philosophical theses.
Nor can one say that the intuition involved in the cogito only applies to consciousess--that the existence part is really superfluous. This is because it is not obvious that "everything" exists. Hallucinations and dreams seem to provide prima facie examples in which we are aware of nonexistent things. Of course, those of a Russellian bent will be inclined to explain away these appearances. But the theory of descriptions is hardly a premise we can use to buttress the soundness of the cogito. Again, the cogito stands on its own--its soundness relies on an immediate insight, not an argument that involves other premises.
But if existence is necesarily connected to consciousness, have we not then shown that consciousness necessarily exists? is not this parallel to the conclusion of the ontological argument with respect to God?
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Call for Papers-Logos 2015: Religious Experience
10 years ago
2 comments:
I distinguish existence and essense by pointing out that blue is darker than yellow even if ever blue and yellow thing cease to exist. Couldn't the necessary connection between consciousness and existence exist contingently?
Crit:
That is an interesting thought. Let's see if the analogy holds.
I take it you mean: there can be a necessary relationship between universals without there being individuals instantiating those universals. But the universals themselves still exist, don't they.
Also I don't think consciousnes is a universal property, its a particular. And the claim is that existence is necessarily connected to it.
So the analogy to consciousness and existence would not be blue and yellow, but "this marker" and "blue." but then the analogy breaks down--there is no necessary connection between the particular and being blue.
But suppose there was such a necessary connection, Blue was necessary to being a marker (like being spatial is essential to being a physical thing, acc. to Descartes). This analogy might be better.
1. Spatial extension is essential to material objects
is compatible with
2. There are no physical objects.
Likewise, in the old ontological argument:
3. God essentially all powerful
is compatible with
4. God does not exist.
But if we shift to existence, the situation is different.
5. God necessarily exists
entails God exists, right?
The problem with the ontological argument, to me, is that no one knows whether the necessarily existing God is really possible.
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