The I

Could I have been Obama? An argument against materialism

In the linked post Victor Reppert argues against materialism by claiming that a materialist world view will not capture one crucial fact: that he is VR.

We can only talk about this in the first person. So I want to consider the fact that I am Gordon Knight. Who is GK? physically I am a living organism of a certain type, with a certain body with certain brain states etc. Victor contends that an objective description of these physical facts leaves out a crucial one: I am GK. I agree with him , but he does not go far enough.
Suppose we have a complete description of not only the physical, but also the psychological facts of me. So we know not only what my brain state is, but also that I am thinking of Descartes, or having a feeling of pain .. whatever. We need not assume that this psychological description is in any way reducible to the physical. We can have a dualistic third person description of the universe.

But even in this case, something extremely crucial is left out. GK is feeling pain. well, that sucks. But it is very different from: I am feeling pain. We could have a complete description of my psychological qualiites, of what I am feeling, what I am thinking etc..

And yet this description would still leave out something crucial

I can know all about GK's feeling of pain. I might feel sorry for him

However well I know what GK is feeling. that knowledge in itself will not allow me to judge "I am GK" or "I am feeling pain":

The I is transcendental.

Hegelian externalism?

Externalist theories of mind hold that at least sometimes mental states are best decribed as including processes, events, or things that are not accessible to consciousness.

The classic example involves two worlds one of which has H2O water and another has phenomenologically indistinguishable water with a different chemical composition (XYZ). If we imagine two people, Sally and George in each of the different worlds both thinking "water is wet" We should conclude that while there is no phenomenological distinction between the two thoughts, nevertheless the content of the two thoughts are different. One is about XYZ water, the other is about H2O water.

Could Hegel be an externalist in this sense? It is easy to see the advantage of interpreting Hegel in this way. Hegelian Spirit extends far beyond individual consciouness' usual haunts and externalism about mind seems to provide a nice way of making sense of this larger, cosmic sense of spirit.

But I don't think this interpretation can be right. Here's why"

(1) Whatever Hegelian idealism is, it at least includes the claim that there are no distinct objects, events etc without concepts. In the Sense Certainty chapter of the Phenomenology it is shown that as soon as we think of a bare sensation, the sensation ceases to be bare, it becomes conceptualized.

(2) concepts do not exist independently of consciousness

I think it follows from these two propositions that there can be no water of an XYZ or H2O variety independent of consciousness. Therefore externalist readings of Hegel put the cart before the horse. We must begin with consciousness and end with consciousness. The apparent divide between object and subject is merely an internal device that spirit has for realizing itself, for becoming conscious of itself.

I guess an externalist would reply that I am beging the question, assuming that consciousness is not itself understood in an externalist way.

I think that a natural reading of the phenomenology belies this objection. In order to enter into sense-certainty, we have to put ourselves in the place of consciousess, we must try to imagine what it is like to be "this here now" consciousness. Only in doing so can we see the internal contradiction that results from this attempt to grasp the mere sensation. The whole phenomenology is an attempt to show how Spirit comes to realize itself *from the inside* The move beyond individual subjectivity is not a move away from an interior conception of consciousness, but rather a way of extending the scope beyond such ordinary finite conceptions.

To take an example: When I think about money, I am thinking of an entity that only has reality in the context of a society. So consciousness of money cannot be understood except in the context of a larger consciousness, one that is greater than me and in some way includes other minds. But this move beyond me takes place within my consciousness--it is this consciousness who tries to grasp what money is, and who finds that in grasping this object essential relation is made to minds other than my own.

I am not endorsing this particular argument against solipsism, but it seems to be how Hegel proceeds (if memory serves, I have yet to look back at the text).

This way of proceeding only makes sense from an internalist perspective.

Reincarnation

There are certain children who are reported to remember past lives. I don't feel equipped to evaluate the question whether such children really exist or whether the reports are accurately described. You can find descriptions of them in Ian Stevenson's work and also in Robert Almeder's book on empirical evidence for the afterlife.

I have in mind cases such as a child seeming to remember being another person, that person not being known by by the child or her family. The things the child seems to remember then turn out ot be true (there really was a person names x, who did y , etc).

Now it seems to me that such cases provide prima facie support for reincarnation. If these "seeming to remember" experiences occur, they provide some support for the thesis that persons sometimes exist prior to their current embodied existence.

Not everyone agrees though. Thus Steven Hales argues that regardless of how well supported, empirically, the particular cases are, it is still not rational to believe they support reincarnation.

The reason given is that we know of no mechanism by which it is possible for a person to continue to exist after death or exist prior to current life. Currently popular materialist theories of mind rule out the very idea of persons existing in some other incarnation.

I don't think this objection is telling because (1) there are good philosophical reasons to object to materialism, appart from appeal to reincarnation type cases (2) It seems that mind body dualism is a theory, and as such is able to make sense of how it is a person can exist prior to or after their current life.

It might be objected that dualism is not a scientific theory, but neither is materialism. The most that can be said is that materialism is suggested by some current scientific research. The empirical data is compatible with dualism, materialism or even idealism.

Cases of the reincarnation type would count as evidence even if we agreed with Hume regarding miracles. Reincarnation, if it occurs, would violate no law of nature.

Disembodied Existence

I have not done much research, but it appears that lot of philosophers deny that disembodied existence is logically or conceptually possible. I don't mean those who hold that given a certain ontology of mind (e.g. materialism) a person cannot exist without her body. I rather have in mind those who think that the very notion of a person existing without his body is incoherent.



As I say, I have not done the research, but it looks like the main reason people hold that disembodied existence is impossible is that when you think through the idea you realize that you cannot make sense out of it. There is some deep contradiction or absurdity in the very idea of me existing without my body.



The best way to respond to this sort of argument is to show that one can easily understand what it means to be disembodied. Consider the following argument:



(1) The senses are fallible

(2) If the senses are fallible, then it is possible that all my current beliefs about my body that are derived from senses are in error

(3) The belief that I am embodied now is derived from my senses



Therefore, (4) It is possible that all my current beliefs about my body, including that I have one, are in error.



I don't see how anyone can deny (1). Maybe (2) is false. It could be that while the senses are fallible, there is something special about sensed body. I guess one could hold that kineasthetic sensations are epistemically privledged, or something like that. But then what would one do with phantom limbs?



Note that (2) does not say that it is possible that *all* the beliefs that I derive from sense percepti in error. It only says my current beliefs are such. A lot of arguments against skepticism purport to show that while the senses may be mistaken here and there, there is something deeply incoherent about supposing that all my sense derived beliefs are false. I am not overly impressed by these arguments, but even if they are sound, they do not call into question the truth of (2)

Thus even if skeptical arguments fail to show that life could be a big dream, they still serve a very important metaphysical function in helping us to understand what is really involved in the concept of the self.


Can anyone think of a reason to deny (3)



So in order to conceive of yourself as dismbodied, you don't need to go through some elaborate thought experiment or have an out of body experience.. You just need to realize that the senses are fallible. You there, reading this, can easily conceive of yourself disembodied right now.

Yes I know I am just chanelling Descartes here. But what is wrong with the reasoning?

Of course it will still seem to you that you are embodied. Nothing has changed with respect to your experience. That is why its so easy!!

I have intentionally made the argument very weak. It only shows that it is possible for a person to exist without a body. It does not show that each of us can exist without a body all the time, or that we never really have bodies (understood as objective metaphysical realities)

The regularity theory

I was talking to my stepfather a few years back and asked him why he was eating a turkey sandwich for lunch. His answer was of the deductive/nomological sort: "I always eat a turkey sandwich for lunch."

What if God was one of us?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B4CRkpBGQzU

One can find good theology in the strangest of places

"what if God was one of us
just a slob like one of us"

This is beautiful.

The essence of Christianity is the incarnation. Yet there is and has been pressure to make the incarnation less radical that it is. God becoming one of us.

The temptation present already in the early church to treat Jesus as perfect being with a mortal mask trivializes the doctrine. If there is a God, God can pretend to be one of us.

But that is not the incarnation. God became one of us.

Took on mortal form, became like you, like me. Jesus got hungry, got horny, got angry.

The taking on human form is the highest expression of love. It is an attempt at communion, at understanding.

It is a bridge of an ontological divide.

To feel what it is like to be a human being, to be a finite creature from the inside, to take on the burden of finitude and embodiment. These are great things for a God to do, beautiful things, daring, bold things.

Those of us who believe this might have actually happened should meditate on this. It, as I write now on a late Saturday night, just blows me away.

Polytheism

I was recently asked to write a review for a book defending Polytheism. When I first saw the book, I could not take it seriously. Paganism today has always struck me as innocuous but intellectually empty. I love the image of hippies dancing naked in the woods, chanting around a big fire. Its a pleasing, if romanticized image, like Socrates's first version of the ideal city. The one dismissed by Glaucon because of the lack of meat and prostitutes.

When Bertrand Russell was asked whether he was an atheist or agnostic he answered "agnostic," and immediately drew an analogy with Hera and Zeus. "These too may exist", Russell said, but we have no reason to think that they do. The intent of the remark was to emphasize how dismissive Russell was of theism, not to pave the way for serious consideration of the existence of a multitude of gods.

And yet, when I stop and ask myself what reasons I have for thinking there is not a plurality of gods, I find very little to substantiate my prejudice. Its true I also have no reasons, as of yet, for thinking there are many gods, but this may be simply because I have not investigated the matter. I am, after all, just a beginning my research into polytheistic apologetics!). I t would certainly not do to imitate some of my students, who often assume that the old theistic arguments are unsuccessful before they even understand what the arguments are.

What this brings to mind is two quite different ways in which people use the word "absurd."

In one way, "absurd" means logically contradictory or in contradiction to some other known or strongly justified belief. Used in this way, absurdity can be an effective an rational means of critiquing someone's belief.

But another way "absurd" just means contrary to prevailing opinion, or contrary to comon belief. Absurd just means "too weird."

But this second sense is just another way of expressing a prejudice. Its like my old professor who, when he did not have an argument would say, "Surely you don't want to hold that view."

When reason fails, just contort your face the right way and put the right emphasis on your words.

Anything can be thought "too weird." Weirdness, unlike truth, is a culturally or psychologically relative notion. Christianity was too weird to pagan Rome. Evolution is too weird to fundamentalist Christians. Paganism is too weird for most of us hard nosed analytic philosophers.


Are there many gods? Right now I doubt it. I have stirring in my mind some reasons that may lead me to reject it. But I could be wrong.